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LAND USE: EXCLUSION OF NON-INDIANS FROM
TRIBAL LANDS-AN ESTABLISHED RIGHT
Joe D. Dillsaver
The Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, in a 1970 opinion,
concluded that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians on tribal lands.' William R. Baldassin and John T.
McDermott, in "Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Opinion of the
'Opinion',"' take issue with the Solicitor. They trace the develop-
ment of the policy of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, contrast
this problem with the idea of tribal sovereignty, and conclude that the
time has arrived to recognize tribal authority over all happenings
within the boundaries of a reservation.'
While complete criminal jurisdiction over the disposition of
non-Indians is lacking for tribal authorities,4 a partial control over
non-Indians is established and has been reaffirmed in two recent
cases. This control is the right to exclude non-Indians from reserva-
tion land." This exclusion right does not address criminal jurisdiction
alone but also encompasses other activities.7 The following discussion
will trace the development of this exclusion, culminating with the
two recent cases mentioned above.
Development
In 18z the Secretary of War of the United States asked the
Attorney General for an opinion of the rights of the Seneca Nation
to exclude trespassers from its land.8 The opinion concluded that the
Senecas did possess the exclusion right: "So long as a tribe exists and
remains in possession of its lands, its title and possession are sovereign
and exclusive; and there exists no authority to enter upon their lands,
for any purpose whatever, without their consent."9
In 1904 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
right of the Chickasaw Nation to exclude non-Indians. Morris Y.
Hitchcock'° involved the right of the Chickasaws to enforce a tax on
livestock in compliance with legislation passed in 1898. Under the
legislation, failure to comply with the act would result in removal of
a noncitizen from the Chickasaw Nation. The Court not only
acknowledged the right of the tribe to establish the conditions under
which the noncitizen could be on the Chickasaw lands, but con-
curred with the tribe's belief that they could exclude those who did
not comply.'
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A similar case in 19o5, Buster v. United States Inspector,2 rein-
forced the exclusion right. The case centered on the right of the
Creek Nation to charge noncitizens who had purchased lots in town-
sites within the nation a permit tax for the privilege of trading on the
lots. The Court upheld the authority of the Creek Nation to pre-
scribe the conditions to be followed by noncitizens conducting busi-
ness within the Indian land.13 "It was one of the inherent and
essential attributes of its original sovereignty."' 4 Part of this authority
was the power to enforce the law15 and to have the noncitizen
removed from the tribal lands.'6
Two later United States government publications commented on
the power of Indians to exclude. Felix Cohen, in the Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, wrote of the protection of tribal possessions and
said that the "use of reasonable force" was privileged to exclude tres-
passers. 17 Also, the 1958 Federal Indian Law, published by the De-
partment of the Interior, recognized the power of the tribe to exclude
nonmembers from its territory.18
Recent Cases
Two recent cases give further credence to the authority of a tribe
to exclude nonmembers from Indian land. The first case is the
Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, a 1972 decision from the Southern District
of the United States District Court of California. 9 This action is for
declaratory and injunctive relief by the tribe against the sheriff of
Imperial County, California, to prevent him from interfering with
tribal game wardens carrying out their duties.
The chief game warden of the Quechan Tribe saw three non-
Indian youths carrying firearms during dove season on the Fort Yuma
Reservation. Since the youths lacked the proper tribal hunting
license, the warden relieved them of their weapons and instructed
them to reclaim them at the tribal headquarters. The youths reported
the incident to the Imperial County sheriff, who arrested the game
warden for grand theft. However, no actual criminal prosecution
followed.
The Quechan Tribe asserts and the court agrees that if a tribe has
been given the right "to hunt, trap, or fish or to control, license or
regulate hunting, trapping, or fishing by any federal treaty, agree-
ment or statute," and there is a conflict between state and Indian
law, the state law is unenforceable on Indian land.20 This right was
established and recognized by the Department of the Interior for
the plaintiff tribe in 1936.21
In describing the right of tribal enforcement of its hunting and
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fishing controls, the court refers to Ordinance 8-6-64, passed by the
Ouechan Tribal Council on August 6, 1964.22 This ordinance "pro-
vides that trespassers may also be referred to appropriate federal
authorities for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1165."23 Even though
founded in the hunting and fishing rights of the Quechan Indians,
the court ultimately found that the tribe does not have the right to
exclude trespassers in protection of those rights. 4 The perspective
is narrowed to a specific enforcement of hunting and fishing rights,
but the implication is that the right to exclude is inherent in tribal
rights.23
A March 19, 1975, decision, Ortiz-Barraza v. United States,2" by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, further strengthens the Indian
exclusionary right of tribal nonmembers on reservation land. Ortiz-
Barraza is not only persuasive for the point of exclusion, "intrinsic in
the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is the power to exclude trespassers
from the reservation,"27 but establishes the right of partial criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, at least up to the point of their delivery
to the appropriate state or local authorities. 8
A Papago Indian Reservation police officer29 observed a white
pickup truck with a camper on Papago land. The truck, coming from
the direction of the Mexican border, was driven by a young Mexican
male whom the officer did not recognize. The officer knew all the
non-Indians in the vicinity and decided to check the registration of
the truck. The young Mexican was not able to produce either a
driver's license or a vehicle registration. The officer then proceeded
to search the camper and found marijuana in it.
Ortiz-Barraza was convicted for importation and possession of
marijuana and his only basis for appeal was that the reservation officer
did not have the authority to conduct the search. The court of appeals
affirmed the actions of the trial court, but interestingly enough, spent
most of the decision dealing not with the question of search and
seizure but the right of the tribe to expel nonmembers. 30
The court of appeals drew its authority to affirm the tribe's right
from several sources. First, the court assumes this is an inherent right
of the sovereignty of an Indian tribe. "A tribe needs no grant of
authority from the federal government in order to exercise this
power."' 1 Second, the court found authority in the constitution of
the Papago Indians and acceptance by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
in 1937 of that constitution. In Article 5, Section 3, the Papago
Council is empowered "[t]o remove or exclude from any of the three
Papago Reservations nonmembers who occupy reservation land with-
out lawful authority and whose presence may be injurious to the
peace, happiness, or welfare of the members of the tribe."' 2 More
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specifically, the court noted the power of the tribe to arrest any
person who is not a member of the tribe for a federal or state crime
and forcibly eject them from the reservation. In responding to the
contention that tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, the court states: "Such holdings, if presently valid, have
not derogated from the sovereign power of tribal authorities to ex-
clude trespassers who have violated state and federal law by deliver-
ing the offenders to the appropriate authorities. '3
To dispel any doubts of the tribal power to exclude non-Indians,
the court of appeals specifically states that the power to regulate is
backed by the power to enforce. "The power of the Papago to exclude
non-Indian state and federal law violators from the reservation would
be meaningless were the tribal police not empowered to investigate
such violations. Obviously, tribal police must have such powers."3"
One other significant part of this decision deserves comment. This
deals with an apparent partial overruling of Ex parte Kenyon30 which
held that tribes cannot exercise any criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. This decision and its effect is commented on and criticized
in the article by Baldassin and McDermott.36 The court of appeals
in Ortiz-Barraza questions the persuasion of Kenyon, "if presently
valid,"37 and flatly rules that the decision has "not derogated" the
authority of a tribe to exclude trespassers who violate state or federal
laws.38
Conclusion
The ability to enforce the exclusion right, as stated before, is the
result of interplay between federal and tribal statutes and principles
of sovereignty. In Quechan the tribal ordinance to exclude was tied
directly to the enforcement of a federal statute.3 ' The power to ex-
clude in Ortiz-Barraza springs from the Papago constitution adopted
in January, 1937.40
These examples from Quechan and Ortiz-Barraza suggest a perim-
eter of extension of the tribal right to exclude. In Quechan the court
recognized the right of the tribe "if the Indians can show that some
federal treaty, agreement, or statute authorizes them to adopt rules
and regulations governing" the trapping, fishing, and hunting on
tribal lands.4 The tribe, of course, bad little difficulty in doing this.
The court in Ortiz-Barraza went straight to the right of the Papago
Tribe to have a constitution 42 and to enforce its provisions:
We find that the actions of the Papago Council, taken together
with the Papago Constitution and the applicable law previously
discussed, clearly established the authority of a tribal police officer
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/10
... to investigate any on-reservation violations of state and federal
law, where the exclusion of the trespassing offender from the reser-
vation may be contemplated.43
The conclusion is preeminent that Indians have a solid base for
significant exclusion powers of non-Indians from tribal lands if the
power is tied to the enforcement of a federal statute or is inherent in
legislation springing from a tribal constitution.
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